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Abstract—Hazard analysis is one of the most important
elements in developing safe-critical systems. STPA (Systems-
Theoretic Process Analysis) is a modern technique based on
the new accident causation model STAMP (System-Theoretic
Accident Model and Process) for analyzing hazard and safety
issues, which can be applied early in the design process of a
system to achieve an acceptable risk level. We have applied
STPA to a well-known example of safety-critical systems in
the automotive industries: Adaptive Cruise Control (ACC). The
results of the application of STPA to our case study and the
limitations and difficulties of applying STPA are presented.
I. INTRODUCTION
A safety critical system is a system, which can cause
hazards for humans, significant property or the environment.
Many safety-critical systems rely on software to achieve their
functions. Software can create hazards through erroneous
control of the system or by misleading the system operators
into taking inappropriate actions [1]. A comprehensive hazard
analysis of such systems is of vital importance, because
dysfunctions can result in accidents. Safety critical-systems
are increasingly used in the automotive industry to provide
convenience and safety features to vehicle drivers and passen-
gers, with increasing levels of automation and control authority
[2]. Modern systems become more complex, that is leading
to accidents in which no components failed (e.g. accidents
which arise from unsafe and unintended interactions among
the system components). New powerful models of accident
causation and hazard analysis techniques are needed to address
these new failure modes. STAMP and STPA are modern
hazard analysis techniques that model and identify hazard and
accident scenarios that are not address by the traditional hazard
techniques [3].
Problem Statement: Recently, STAMP/STPA has been ap-
plied to different applications areas. As a rather new technique,
it is not described in enough detail to be applied in all contexts
in practices. Safety is one of the essential and vital aspects for
the automotive domain, which relies on many safety-critical
embedded control units. In the automotive domain, there is
only little experience with STAMP/STPA.
Research Objectives: The overall objective of this research
is to investigate the benefits and the potential problems of
applying STAMP/STPA in industry to get an understanding of
their effect and problems in the applications. In particular, we
aim first to understand how these approaches can be useful
for automotive safety, and second to provide an assessment of
the usage of these approaches.
Contribution: We use STPA in a case study in the auto-
motive domain to investigate the scenarios of accidents. The
case study analyses the application of STPA and its difficulties
for a real system in a commercial vehicle. The result is a set
of causal factors and recommendation for the future design of
the system.
Context: The research concentrates on applying STPA to
the automotive domain and is performed based on published
knowledge from a case study with MAN Truck & Bus AG [4].
Related Work: STAMP and STPA have been successfully
applied to different systems in different areas such as Space
Shuttle Operations [5], Railroad Safety in China [6] and
Darlington Shutdown System [7]. In the automotive domain, a
preliminary example to apply STPA in the automotive domain
was by Hommes [8]. We applied STPA to the whole ACC
system and provided the causal factors of each part of the
system.
II. STUDY DESIGN
Study Object: We applied the STPA hazard analysis
technique to Adaptive Cruise Control (ACC). ACC is an
automotive feature that allows a vehicle’s cruise control system
to adapt the vehicle’s speed to the traffic environment. ACC
uses a long range radar sensor which is attached to the front
of the vehicle and detects a target vehicle up to 150 meters
in front. The ACC system is able to automatically adjust the
driving speed as well as the distance to the vehicle ahead in
accordance with the pre-settings
Research Questions: This paper addresses two research
questions: 1) How can STPA improve the safety in the automo-
tive domain? and 2) What are potential problems of applying
STPA to automotive safety? To address these questions, we
conducted a case study of applying STPA to safety-critical
automotive systems.
Data Collection and Analysis: STPA can be applicable
to an existing design or be used before a design has been
created. STPA uses the existing knowledge about the system,
control diagrams, functional requirements, safety constraints
and safety requirements as fundamentals to guide the analysis
process. Thus, we started with a thorough investigation of the
structure, existing information, documentation and safety cases
Fig. 1. The Process Model for ACC Module with Causal factors leading to hazards.
of the ACC system to get a full understanding about the study
object and establish the fundamentals. The case study uses
the three steps of STPA for identifying the potential hazard
scenarios of the ACC system. The following describes the
process of analysis in the case study:
1) Investigate the system structure, goals, components, re-
quirements, functions and components interaction.
2) Elicit the system requirements, safety constraints.
3) Identify the potential accidents and unacceptable losses
for the system, the system hazards at system level.
4) Draw the functional control diagram of the system.
5) Apply step 2 and step 3 of STPA to the control structure.
6) Refine the safety requirements and constraints.
III. RESULTS
In this section, we present a part of our results:
1) System Accidents: The accidents to be considered are:
• Accident 1: The ACC vehicle crashes with a vehicle
in front when the ACC system is in active mode
(Forward collision vehicle to vehicle).
• Accident 2: The vehicle behind crashes the ACC
vehicle when the ACC system detects an object
in the ACC path (Backward collision vehicle to
vehicle).
2) System-Level Hazards:
• H.1: ACC violates the safe distance between ACC
vehicle and vehicle in front.
• H.2: ACC estimates wrong values of distance and
speed of vehicle ahead.
3) Safety-Control Structure Diagram: Figure 1 shows the
safety control structure diagram of the ACC module and
the brake control module at the system level of the ACC
system. The generic control loop is used to guide the
analysis process.
4) Safety-Control Actions: An example of an safety con-
trol action is providing radar data which can be docu-
mented with four types of hazardous control actions:
Not Given: Radar sensor does not provide the relative
speed and distance of objects ahead of vehicle.
Given Incorrectly: Radar sensor provides incorrect data
of target vehicle speed.
Wrong Timing or Order: The data of radar sensor
comes too late when the distance to a forward vehicle
is too close.
Stopped too soon or applied too long: Radar sensor
is stopped too soon that the ACC module does not get
the relative data signal of target vehicle.
5) Safety-Related Constraints: Each unsafe control action
is then translated into a component-level safety con-
straint (e.g. the radar sensor must detect the small objects
which are in the path of the vehicle and send the data
early to the ACC module).
6) Causal Factors: To create causal scenarios, the control
structure (shown in figure 1) is first augmented with
process models for each component. For example, con-
sider an unsafe hazardous control action: the braking is
commended when there is no slowed or stopped object
in the vehicle path. The analysis in this step shows
that one potential cause of that action is an incorrect
process model of ACC module which is may be due to
failed radar sensor or the feedback of brake status or the
feedback may be delayed or corrupted.
A. Improvement potentials
By applying STPA to our object study, we derived the
following improvement potentials to the ACC system:
• The radar sensor in the front shall detect small objects
(e.g. a motorcycle) or a vehicle driving far off center.
• An extra radar sensor should be added in the back of
the vehicle to detect the speed and distance of vehicles
behind.
B. Problems
According to our experience, the third step of STPA needs
a lot of effort, time and deep knowledge for examining the
controller with process models variables and assessing each
path of the control loop to see if this path can lead to unsafe
control actions. Moreover, STPA does not show or provide a
systematic way on how to make these arguments, e.g. examine
inadequate control algorithm, to help the analyst in this step.
STPA needs a systematic method to notate the relation between
the process model variables, control actions and hazards.
We also found STPA has limitations for analyzing multiple
controllers in the control loop of a system. For example, the
ACC system has two controller modules: ACC module and
Engine Control Module (ECM), which are connected together
and used to control the vehicle speed. Both of them receive
the vehicle speed information from the brake control module.
ECM sends brake switch command to the ACC module and
the ACC module sends the ACC state target speed to ECM.
It is not clear how we can provide an action table and casual
factors for multiple controllers with interference among the
actions.
C. Comparison
We conducted a case study applying safety cases for the
same ACC system [4]. In comparison, we found STPA to
have a more systematic, step-by-step process, while safety
cases provide clear means to structure the risk argumentation.
STPA considers the safety of a system as a control problem,
assumes worst-case scenarios and identifies potential scenarios
that could lead to that worst case while the safety case presents
the argument that shows the system under consideration is
acceptably safe in a given operating context. The combination
of STAMP and STPA is suited for an in-depth analysis of the
complete systems and its internal control. It has no detailed
description, however, how to present the final argumentation
about the hazards avoided and remaining risks. Safety cases
could fill this void, but they are not well suitable for the system
analysis.
We also compare our case study with a preliminary example
of applying STPA to ACC system which was presented by
Hommes [8]. We extended her example by considering the
two types of vehicle collisions which are related to the ACC
system (e.g. forward collision and backward collision) and
more hazards at the system level. Moreover, we considered
the intervention between driver and ACC system. We also
considered the application of STPA to a whole ACC system
as comprehensive analysis and provided the potential causal
factors for each part of control loop of ACC system. Finally,
we provided recommendations for a further design of the
system. The details will appear in the full version of the paper.
IV. CONCLUSION
We investigated the application of STAMP/STPA to auto-
motive domain and its difficulties in that domain. In analyzing
accidents and potential inadequate controls, we have found
STPA to be a more powerful and useful technique that can
be used to evaluate safety-critical systems in the automotive
domain by identifying the potential accident scenarios that
include the entire accident process, including design errors,
software flaws, component interaction accidents and human
decision-making errors contributing to accidents.
We aim as future work to integrate a state machine analysis
with STPA to provide a suitable notation of arguments between
the states of controller and control actions. Moreover, we plan
to integrate our experience with safety/risk cases and exam-
ine additional potential benefits of STPA in the automotive
domain.
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